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Measuring the effects of mergers and acquisitions on the economic 
performance of real estate developers 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Real estate developers in China are using mergers and acquisitions (M&As) to ensure 
their survival and competitiveness. However, no suitable method is yet available to 
assess whether such M&As provide enhanced value for those involved. Using a 
hybrid method of data envelopment analysis (DEA) and Malmquist total factor 
productivity (TFP) indices, this paper evaluates the short and medium term effects of 
M&As on acquirers’ economic performance with a set of 32 M&A cases occurring 
during 2000-2011 in China.  
The results of the analysis show that M&As generally have a positive effect on 
acquirers’ economic performance. Acquisitions on average experienced a steady 
growth in developer Malmquist TFP, a more progressive adoption of technology 
immediately after acquisition, a slight short-term decrease in technical efficiency after 
acquisition but followed by a marked increase in the longer term once the integration 
and synergy benefits were realised. However, there is no evidence to show whether 
developers achieved any short or long term scale efficiency improvements after M&A. 
The findings of this study provide useful insights on developer M&A performance 
from an efficiency and productivity perspective. 
Keywords：Mergers and acquisitions, real estate, developers, efficiency, total factor 
productivity, China. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Real estate is China’s fastest-growing industry as its formation and development 
follows China’s economic reform in the 1980’s (Choi, 1998). Since 2004, the Chinese 
government has enacted a series of macro-economic regulatory policies to mitigate 
the risk of a real estate bubble. This has resulted in a wave of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) of developers in the industry, and both the number of deals and 
volume of developer M&As have increased sharply since 2006 (see Table 1), making 
the industry one of the most M&A active in China today. However, it is not yet clear 
whether developer M&As lead to better post-acquisition performance or not.  
Please insert Table <1> here 
The most commonly used methods to evaluate M&A performance in the business 
domain include event studies, cash flow analysis and market value frontiers (Franks 
and Harris, 1989; Healy et al., 1992; Sudarsanam et al., 1996; Mitchell et al., 2004). 
However, as Antoniou & Zhao (2011) point out, these methods are unable to provide 
meaningful insights or usable information on the extent to which M&As create value. 
Furthermore, in order to evaluate the M&A performance, a single factor (e.g. cash 
flow, value added) is not enough to compare the acquirers’ performance before and 
after a M&A. Multiple inputs and outputs should be considered for a comprehensive 
evaluation.  
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a powerful methodology for assessing the 
relative efficiencies of multi-input and multi-output production units. Established by 
Charnes et al (1978) based on the work of Farrell (1957), DEA has the advantage of 
not needing to select a particular functional form, make distributional assumptions or 
set the relative weights of variables. It has good statistical characteristics and is a very 
convenient method for detecting efficiency and productivity changes in individual 
organisations (Charnes et al, 1978; Cooper, et al, 2007a, 2008b), making it very 
suitable for evaluating and comparing the performance of developer M&As. 
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However, DEA measures the efficiency and productivity of decision units for a 
specific period of time and does not allow any analysis of changes over time. 
Meanwhile, the Malmquist total factor productivity (TFP) indices can help evaluate 
the total factor productivity change of a particular organisation over a fixed period, 
although it could be applied equally well in other areas (Caves et al., 1982; Färe et al 
1994a,b; Cooper et al, 2007b; Kortelainen, 2008). Malmquist indices have several 
desirable features and properties: (1) there is no need to make behavioural 
assumptions, such as cost minimisation or profit maximisation, which makes them 
useful when the producer’s objectives differ, or are unknown or are unachieved; (2) 
no need to provide price information, which makes the indices of practical use when 
either prices do not exist, are distorted or have little economic meaning; and (3) they 
can easily be calculated by the DEA methodology (Caves et al, 1982; Färe et al, 
1998). All these issues make the DEA-based Malmquist TFP Index very suitable for 
evaluating M&A induced performance changes as a result of real estate acquisitions. 
The purpose of this study is, therefore, to establish the extent to which developer 
M&As increase the acquirers’ economic performance using the DEA-based 
Malmquist TFP Index. The next section develops and explains the DEA-Malmquist 
method for assessing developer M&A performance. This is followed by an illustration 
of the method and test on a set of 32 Chinese developer M&As between 2000-2011. 
The results of the analysis are then presented prior to some concluding remarks. 
 
REVIEW OF POST-ACQUISITION PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
Many studies have examined the stock returns of acquisitions to investigate the effect 
of M&A transactions on acquisitions. The event-study methodology, first proposed by 
Fama et al. (1969) is often used. This focuses on the long-term (e.g. one to five year) 
effect following an event (e.g., a takeover) and can provide key evidence concerning 
market efficiency (Brown and Warner, 1980; Fama, 1991). However, the event-study 
methodology has several shortcomings.  Firstly, for a long-term event study it is 
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more difficult to isolate the takeover effects from many other strategic and operational 
decisions or changes in the financial policy arising in the long term. Secondly, 
benchmark performance often suffers from measurement or statistical problems 
(Barber and Lyon, 1997). For example, according to Barber and Lyon (1997), 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), which is often used to investigate the effect of 
extraneous events on stock prices by calculating the sum of all the differences 
between the expected returns and the actual returns up to a given point in time, is a 
biased predictor for long-term event studies.  
 
Two other main methods of assessing and calibrating post-event risk-adjusted 
performance have been adopted in the past to measure long-run abnormal stock 
returns: a characteristic-based matching approach and Jensen’s alpha approach, which 
is also known as the calendar time portfolio approach (Fama, 1998; Eckbo, Masulis, 
and Norli, 2000; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). However, despite extensive studies of 
these two types of long-term event study methods, there is still no clear preference 
(Kothari and Warner, 2005). Both have low power against economically interesting 
null hypotheses and neither is immune from misspecification (Jegadeesh and Karceski, 
2004). Considering these power and specification problems, the challenge of refining 
long-term event methods remains (Kothari and Warner, 2005). 
 
THE DEA-MALMQUIST METHOD 
Selection of Performance Evaluation Indicators (Inputs and Outputs) 
In order to select appropriate input and output indicators for performance evaluation, 
a close examination of the real estate industry in China is required. Real estate 
development is a capital intensive industry that demands huge financial commitments 
to cover the high price of land acquisition and substantial expenditure in the 
construction process. This implies that one of the first requirements of a developer is a 
strong financial capability. To reflect this, the equity ratio (input 1) was selected as it 
reflects the financing capability and capital structure of the organisation. Accordingly, 
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the stockholders return ratio (output 1) is adopted as an output indicator for assessing 
the contribution of capital input. 
 
Furthermore, the production process of the real estate industry involves a long period 
of time and massive capital investment. Although property project presales can 
produce some capital in advance, developers still need to access further finance 
through other channels for the large amount of capital needed to cover construction 
costs. Therefore, the quick ratio (output 2), which measures the ability of an 
organisation to use its liquid capital to immediately overcome its current liabilities, is 
also adopted as an output indicator. 
 
As property is expensive, the customers' purchasing intentions are normally 
influenced by their expected income and attitude towards future economic prospects. 
Developers, on the other hand, need to formulate appropriate operation strategies 
depending on the economic situation. To reflect the impact of this, inventory turnover 
(input 2) - representing the property selling condition and resources commitment - is 
used as an input indicator. Return on sales (output 3) is the corresponding output 
indicator. 
 
In China's real estate industry, land is generally regarded as a core production material 
and long-term asset, and developers always experience fierce competition and need a 
substantial amount of capital commitment for its purchase. To raise the funds needed, 
developers generally use land as a mortgage tool for obtaining quick cash. 
Additionally, developers in China use presales (such as a 20% to 30% down payment) 
to lower investment barriers for individuals and appeal to more consumers to buy 
properties. By using these methods, developers improve their cash flow and transfer 
the risks involved in money collection to financial institutions such as banks. To 
reflect this aspect of developer performance, the receivable turnover ratio (input 3) is 
adopted as an input indicator, with the cash flow ratio (output 4) as an output 
indicator. 
7 
 
Finally, due to the ferocity of competition, developers need to compete in price, 
quality, service, product delivery, etc. Specifically, requirements such as vast 
investment resources and long construction periods make the profitability of 
developers particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in the economic environment and 
the market. To reflect the effect of market competition on developer performance, the 
return of assets (output 5) is used as an output indicator. 
In short, three input indicators (Stockholder Equity Ratio, Inventory Turnover and 
Receivable Turnover Ratio) and five output indicators (Return on Equity, Return on 
Sales, Quick Ratio, Cash Flow Ratio and Return on Assets) are used in the analysis. It 
should be noted that all the output indictors are related to economic performance, and 
it is not the intention to investigate social or environmental performance at this stage.  
 
DEA Efficiency Estimation 
DEA is a modern frontier analysis method for efficiency estimation, comprising 
technical efficiency, pure technical, allocative, scale, cost and revenue efficiency 
(Cooper et al. 2007b). The efficient value range is from 0 to 1, where 1 is regarded as 
the most efficient. In this paper, technical efficiency, pure technical efficiency and 
scale efficiency are used to measure acquirer efficiency. Technical efficiency is 
measured by using an input-oriented model (Shepherd, 1970). Assume Decision 
Making Unit (DMU) i uses M inputs x୧୲ to generate N outputs y୧୲ in period t. The 
production technology of period t can be modelled by an input function. For any 
y୲ϵℝା୒, V୰୲ሺy୲ሻ denotes the subset of all input vectors x୲ϵℝା୑ which yield at least	y୲, 
using a production technology characterised by returns to scale of type	r, where r = c 
= constant returns to scale (CRS), r = v = variable returns to scale (VRS), and r = n = 
non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS). The input-oriented distance function is 
 D୰୲ሺx୧ୱ, y୧ୱሻ = sup ൜θ୧ୱ: ൬୶౟
౩
஘౟౩
, y୧ୱ൰ ϵ	V୰୲ሺy୧ୱሻൠ  
 = ሺinfሼθ୧ୱ: ሺθ୧ୱx୧ୱ, y୧ୱሻሽሻିଵ (1) 
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where ሺx୧ୱ, y୧ୱሻ is the input and output vector for DMU i during period s. 
 
Technical efficiency TE୰୲ሺx୧୲, y୧୲ሻ		is thus defined as	TE୰୲ሺx୧୲, y୧୲ሻ = 1 D୰୲ሺx୧୲, y୧୲ሻ⁄ . CRS 
technical efficiency is measured for each DMU by solving a linear programming 
problem 
 ൫Dୡ୲ ሺx୧ୱ, y୧ୱሻ൯ିଵ = TEୡ୲ሺx୧୲, y୧୲ሻ = min θ୧୲	, (2) 
Subject to: Y୲λ୧୲ ≥ y୧୲ , 
X୲λ୧୲ ≤ θ୧୲x୧୲ and 
λ୧୲ ≥ 0	, 
where X୲ is a ܯ × ܫ input matrix and Y୲ an	ܰ × ܫ output matrix for all DMUs, λ୧୲ 
is an ܫ × 1 intensity vector, and	ܫ  = the number of DMUs in the sample (i = 
1,2,. . . ,	ܫ). This estimation (with the λ୧୲ constrained to be non-negative) generates a 
CRS frontier. 
Technical efficiency can be divided into pure technical efficiency 	TE୴୲ ሺx୧୲, y୧୲ሻ 
(technical efficiency relative to a VRS frontier) and scale efficiency	SE୲ሺx୧୲, y୧୲ሻ, as 
TEୡ୲ሺx୧୲, y୧୲ሻ = TE୴୲ ሺx୧୲, y୧୲ሻSE୲ሺx୧୲, y୧୲ሻ.	 These are separated by solving equation (2) 
with the additional constraint:	∑ λ୧୲ = 1ூ୧ୀଵ  for a VRS frontier, and with the constraint 
∑ λ୧୲ ≤ 1ூ୧ୀଵ  for a NIRS frontier. Pure technical efficiency is the solution to the VRS 
problem, and scale efficiency is then obtained by 
SE୲ሺx୧୲, y୧୲ሻ = TEୡ୲ሺx୧୲, y୧୲ሻ TE୴୲ ሺx୧୲, y୧୲ሻ⁄ . If 	SE୲ሺx୧୲, y୧୲ሻ = 1 , CRS are indicated. If 
SE୲ሺx୧୲, y୧୲ሻ ≠ 1 and NIRS efficiency=	TE୴୲ , DRS are indicated; if SE୲ሺx୧୲, y୧୲ሻ ≠ 1 
and NIRS efficiency 	≠ TE୴୲  then IRS are present. 
 
DEA-based Malmquist analysis of productivity 
The Malmquist index approach is adopted to measure the total factor productivity 
(TFP) change of DMUs over time. The description below draws primarily upon the 
work of Fare et al (1994a, 1998) and recaps some of the discussion from Coelli et al 
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(2005). The Malmquist TFP change index (output-orientated) between period s (the 
start period) and period t is given by (Caves et al, 1982) 
 M଴ሺxୱ, yୱ, x୲, y୲ሻ = ቂୈబ
౩ሺ୶౪,୷౪ሻ
ୈబ౩ሺ୶౩,୷౩ሻ
× ୈబ౪ ሺ୶౪,୷౪ሻୈబ౪ ሺ୶౩,୷౩ሻቃ
ଵ ଶ⁄
 (3) 
The distance function D଴ୱሺxୱ, yୱሻ = infሼ∅: ሺxୱ, yୱ ∅⁄ ሻ ∈ Sୱሽ  is defined as the 
reciprocal of the “maximum” proportional expansion of the output vector ys in given 
inputs xs. Similarly, the distance function D଴ୱሺx୲, y୲ሻ = infሼ∅: ሺx୲, y୲/∅ሻ ∈ Sୱሽ 
represents the distance from period t to the period s technology. A value of M0 larger 
than one means that the TFP grows from period s to period t, otherwise a decline in 
TFP is indicated. 
By rearranging function 3, the TFP index can be decomposed into the product of the 
technical change index and the technical efficiency change index as 
 M଴ሺxୱ, yୱ, x୲, y୲ሻ = ୈబ
౪ ሺ୶౪,୷౪ሻ
ୈబ౩ሺ୶౩,୷౩ሻ
ቂୈబ౩ሺ୶౪,୷౪ሻୈబ౪ ሺ୶౪,୷౪ሻ ×
ୈబ౩ሺ୶౩,୷౩ሻ
ୈబ౪ ሺ୶౩,୷౩ሻ
ቃଵ ଶ
⁄
 (4) 
In equation (4), the ratio outside the square brackets is actually the efficiency change 
(EC), which evaluates the change in the output-oriented measure of Farrell technical 
efficiency between periods s and t: 
 EC = ୈబ౪ ሺ୶౪,୷౪ሻୈబ౩ሺ୶౩,୷౩ሻ (5) 
The remaining part of equation (4) concerns technical change (TC), which measures 
the geometric mean of the shift in technology between the two periods s and t: 
 TC = ቂୈబ౩ሺ୶౪,୷౪ሻୈబ౪ ሺ୶౪,୷౪ሻ ×
ୈబ౩ሺ୶౩,୷౩ሻ
ୈబ౪ ሺ୶౩,୷౩ሻ
ቃଵ ଶ
⁄
 (6) 
Furthermore, Fare et al (1994b) decomposed technical efficiency change into "pure" 
technical efficiency change and scale efficiency change. The pure efficiency change 
(PEC) is defined in equation (7) as: 
 PEC = ୈబ౬౪ ሺ୶౪,୷౪ሻୈబ౬౩ ሺ୶౩,୷౩ሻ (7) 
and the scale efficiency change (SEC) is written as 
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 SEC = ቂୈబ౬౪ ሺ୶౪,୷౪ሻ ୈబౙ౪ ሺ୶౪,୷౪ሻൗୈబ౬౪ ሺ୶౩,୷౩ሻ ୈబౙ౪ ሺ୶౩,୷౩ሻൗ ×
ୈబ౬౩ ሺ୶౪,୷౪ሻ ୈబౙ౩ ሺ୶౪,୷౪ሻ⁄
ୈబ౬౩ ሺ୶౩,୷౩ሻ ୈబౙ౩ ሺ୶౩,୷౩ሻ⁄
ቃ
ଵ ଶ⁄
 (8) 
The SEC is actually the geometric mean of two SEC measures relative to period t and 
s technology respectively. 
The Malmquist TFP index (distance measures) in equation (3) can be calculated by 
using a DEA-like linear programming methodology (Fare et al 1994a). For the 
organisation i-th, four distance functions need to be calculated to measure the TFP 
change between two periods. These four distances can be obtained by the four linear 
programming problems (equations 9-12): 
 
	
ሾD଴୲ ሺx୲, y୲ሻሿ
ିଵ = max∅,஛∅ , (9) 
st  −∅x୧୲ + X୘λ ≥ 0	, 
    y୧୲ − Y୲λ ≥ 0 , 
    λ ≥ 0 , 
 ሾD଴ୱሺxୱ, yୱሻሿିଵ = max∅,஛∅ , (10) 
st  −∅x୧ୱ + Xୗλ ≥ 0	, 
    y୧ୱ − Yୱλ ≥ 0 , 
    λ ≥ 0 ,  
 ሾD଴୲ ሺxୱ, y୲ሻሿିଵ = max∅,஛∅ , (11) 
st  −∅x୧ୱ + X୘λ ≥ 0	, 
    y୧ୱ − Y୲λ ≥ 0 , 
    λ ≥ 0 , 
and 
 ሾD଴ୱሺx୲, y୲ሻሿିଵ = max∅,஛∅ , (12) 
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st  −∅x୧୲ + Xୗλ ≥ 0	, 
    y୧୲ − Yୱλ ≥ 0 , 
    λ ≥ 0 ,  
where θ is a scalar and λ is a I×l vector of constants. The value of θ is the efficiency 
score for the i-th organisation.  To calculate the PEC index (equation 7) and the SEC 
index (equation 8), two additional LPs are required on the basis of the LPs 9 and10 
respectively, with only the convexity restriction (Πλ=l) added to each. The DEAP 
version 2.1 is used to evaluate the DEA and Malmquist index. Details of DEAP 
version 2.1 are provided in Coelli (1996). 
 
Estimation Windows 
To compare the value of the Malmquist TFP index before and after acquisition, three 
estimation windows are established that include four time points such as one year 
prior to acquisition (t-1), acquisition announcement (t+0), one year after acquisition 
(t+1) and three years after acquisition (t+3). The two windows: window (1) from (t-1) 
to (t+1); and window (2) from (t-1) to (t+3) represent the short-term and relatively 
long-term windows of the M&As respectively. 
 
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE AND TESTING 
 
Data sources and sampling 
 
M&A transactions are identified from the Thomson Financial Securities Data's SDC 
and Bloomberg database. For the Chinese real estate industry, M&A information can 
be obtained from (1) the China Real Estate Industry Research Database, and (2) the 
China-listed Firm’s Merger & Acquisition Dataset. A total of 32 Chinese developer 
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M&As cases were selected at random according to the following criteria: (1) there 
must be a transfer of ownership between acquirers and their targets; (2) acquirers are 
from the real estate industry; (3) their operation and financial data are available in the 
databases. 
 
Summary statistics 
The financial operational indicators of acquirers and target developers are summarised 
in Table 3, which provides a general background and context of the sample cases’ 
performances. This shows that acquirers are 2.77, 2.35, 3.51 and 2.25 times larger 
than the target developers on total assets, debt, cash and market value respectively. In 
contrast, the acquirers have relatively smaller financial leverage, Tobin’s Q, Cash & 
Growth, return on equity, and return on assets. This first indicates that the 
management efficiency and profitability of the target developers is much higher than 
that of the acquirers in the sample. Second, it clearly shows that that the M&As 
generally occur between acquirers with a large business scale and target developers 
with high managerial efficiency and profitability.  
Please insert Table <2> here 
The information relating to the input and output indicators is summarised in Table 4. 
For the input indicators, the equity ratio increased slightly from 0.36 in t-1 to 0.38 in 
t+3, indicating an increased capital commitment from acquirers after acquisition. The 
acquirers’ average inventory turnover decreased significantly from 0.94 in period t-1 
to 0.44 in period t+3. The receivables turnover ratio decreased dramatically from 227 
to 117 from t-1 to t+1, but then increased slightly to 241 in t+3. In terms of output 
indicators, both ROE and ROS increased significantly from the pre-acquisition to 
post-acquisition phase. The acquirer’s average quick ratio experienced little 
fluctuation from t-1 to t+3. Conversely, the cash flow ratio was highly volatile during 
the same period. Finally, there was a substantial rise in the acquirers’ average return 
on assets from t-1 to t+3, increasing to a mean 0.06 in the short term and 0.04 in the 
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longer term. All in all, the selected input and output indicators mainly show a trend of 
better financial performance of the sample cases after the M&As with five out of eight 
indicators recording an increased value. Of the other three indicators, one has only a 
slight decrease from 0.69 at t-1 to 0.68 at t+1, with the remaining two in an obvious 
relative decline. 
Please insert Table <3> here 
The efficiency of acquirers measured by the DEA method is illustrated in Table 5. 
Their average technical efficiency decreased significantly from 0.93 in t-1 to 0.74 in 
t+3, with the lowest being 0.72 in t+1. This means that technical efficiency declined 
sharply in the short-term after acquisition, but recovered slightly since the realisation 
of the synergy and integration benefits of M&A in longer term. Similarly, pure 
technical efficiency sharply declined from 0.94 to 0.81 during t-1 to t+1, but rose to 
0.86 in t+3. In contrast, scale efficiency experienced a continual decline in both the 
short and long-term, dropping gradually from 0.98 to 0.85 – implying that no 
economies of scale were achieved. 
Please insert Table <4> here 
Productivity measuring result analysis 
The Malmquist TFP index of each acquirer is provided in Table 6. In terms of average 
value during t-0 to t+3, 17 organisations had TFP growth, while the remaining 15 
experienced a decline in productivity. Acquirer 29, with a TFP index of 2.24 (TEC* 
TC=1*2.24) had the most productivity growth - attributed to considerable technical 
improvement after acquisition - with other indices such as TEC, PEC and SEC 
remaining unchanged. In contrast, Acquirer 8 and Acquirer 4 had the poorest 
performance, with a mean TFP of 0.66. Both these organisations experienced a 
dramatic decrease in technical efficiency and technology during acquisition. Other 
acquirers’ performance can be understood in a similar way based on the TFP index 
changes. For example, Acquirers 15, 16 and 20 experienced TFP increases for periods 
t+0, t+1 and t+3 respectively, implying a short-term productivity growth through the 
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M&A but reducing in the long-term. Acquirer 29’s TEC of 1.32 
(TEC=PEC*SEC=1.12*1.17) indicates that its pure technical efficiency and scale 
efficiency had both also made some progress. 
Please insert Table <5> here 
It is noticeable that the mean Malmquist TFP index is highest (1.26) in the M&A year 
(t+0), and then decreased significantly to 0.81 in the following year (t+1). In the 
longer term after acquisition (t+3), the acquirers’ mean TFP improved slightly to 1.02. 
The reasons for these changes can be identified from the TEC and TC perspectives: 
The acquirers’ technology had the largest upgrade in t+0, with a slight increase at t+1 
and followed by a slight decrease by t+3. In contrast, the mean technical efficiency of 
the acquirers markedly declined in both t+0 (0.96) and t+1 (0.79), but rose in t+3 
(1.03). This clearly suggests, therefore, that the M&As improved acquirers’ 
technology in the short-term was due to a greater commitment of resources, but the 
growth began to diminish in the longer term as the effect of the M&As on resource 
investment weakened. Meanwhile, technical efficiency decreased in t+0 and t+1 
because of organisational transition in the short-term while, in the longer term, 
technical efficiency increased as the synergy and integration benefits were realised. 
Similarly, PEC can be interpreted in the same way as TEC. Surprisingly, neither short 
nor long term increases in scale efficiencies were realised after the M&As, which is 
consistent with previous scale efficiency analysis results. The reason for this is 
probably due to the real estate industry’s unique characteristics of localisation and 
unmovable products . 
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper uses a synthesis of DEA and Malmquist index methods to investigate the 
efficiency and productivity changes of real estate acquirers, as illustrated and tested 
with a sample of 32 M&A cases from the Chinese real estate industry. The statistical 
analysis indicates that the industry has been experiencing a “big fish eats fingerling” 
15 
 
style of acquisition, in which big developers with large amounts of cash acquire target 
developers with high development potential. The analysis shows that the financial 
performance of most of the sample acquirers improved after the M&As. For those that 
experienced poorer performance after the M&As, the major reason appears to be 
inefficient management during their transitional integration. The productivity analysis 
indicates a trend of better performance after the M&As, which is consistent with the 
result of the statistical analysis and provide a clear answer to the research question of 
this paper. 
However, the results of the efficiency analysis present a slightly different picture. On 
the one hand, technology adoption increases in the short-term immediately after the 
M&As, due to the newly inputted resources at that time, but gradually declines as the 
new technology beds in. On the other hand, technical efficiency decreases 
immediately after the M&As, which is probably due to inefficient management of the 
integration process needed as a result of the M&As, then it increases gradually over 
time when the integration of the transition becomes more smooth. Furthermore, no 
economies of scale were found from the results of the efficiency analysis, which 
nevertheless provided a number of practical implications. First, it is suggested that the 
acquirers maintain a continuous investment in technology after the M&As in order to 
enable a consistent level of technical commitment. Second, integration should be 
managed more efficiently in order to speed up the transitional process for improved 
technical efficiency. Finally, as M&As are not able to positively affect economies of 
scale, other means, such as better marketing performance or better procurement, 
should be applied . 
Overall, the findings of this research reflect the characteristics of the real estate 
industry in China in that M&As provide a number of value-enhancing results for 
acquirers, but with no significant economies of scale due to increased organisation 
size. It should be pointed out that the results of the analysis depend on the selection of 
specific inputs and outputs indicators and it is therefore possible to obtain different 
results by changing the input and output indicators used. Additionally, the selection of 
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different sample cases may also result in different outcomes. As there are more than 
100 China real estate M&As cases from 2006 to 2011, the detailed findings from the 
32 sample cases may not necessarily generalise to the China’s real estate industry 
overall. Nevertheless, the method used in this paper provides a useful and valid 
measure of developer M&A performance from an efficiency and productivity 
perspective and provides valuable insights on the general consequences of M&A 
decisions in the real estate industry in China and elsewhere.   
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Table 1. Chinese real estate M&A deals from 2006 to 2011 (Jan to Feb) 
Year No. of deals 
No. of deals 
(disclosed) 
M&A amount (US 
$M) 
Average M&A 
amount (US $M) 
2006 3 3 160.28 53.43 
2007 3 3 1540.42 513.47 
2008 4 2 512.00 256.00 
2009 20 20 2971.80 148.59 
2010 84 75 2582.44 34.43 
2011 (Jan-Feb) 22 22 1149.87 52.27 
Total 136 125 8916.81 71.33 
Source: Zero2IPO Research Center, March 2011. 
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Table 2. Operational indicators of acquirer and target developers 
Items 
Acquirers Targets Difference: 
acquirer/  
target Mean Min Max Mean Min Max 
Total assets (Yuan) 9.07E+09 3.63E+07 5.98E+10 3.28E+09 610441 5.48E+10 2.77 
Debt (Yuan) 5.63E+09 1.59E+07 3.95E+10 2.40E+09 514617 3.35E+10 2.35 
Cash (Yuan) 1.40E+09 3993385 8.92E+09 3.99E+08 -2.31E+08 6.03E+09 3.51 
Market value (Yuan) 1.15E+10 1.77E+08 6.76E+10 5.12E+09 71642.25 5.48E+10 2.25 
Financial Leverages 11.8840 1.6700 74.3200 12.2216 0.0073 58.3294 0.97 
Tobin’s' Q 2.9390 1.5500 7.0700 5.2771 1.5615 37.0533 0.56 
Cash & Growth 0.3963 0.0800 1.4700 2.2948 0.0426 37.1513 0.17 
Return on Equity 0.1150 0.0000 0.4400 0.1885 0.0198 0.8881 0.61 
Return on Assets 0.0588 0.0000 0.3600 0.0792 0.0019 0.3585 0.74 
Note: Tobin’s Q is an indicator generally used to measure the management efficiency of organisations (Lang et al, 1989, Servaes, 
1991, Chung and Pruitt, 1994). Tobin’s Q = (the organisation’s market value + liquidation value of preferred stock DEBT)/ Total 
assets; If T’s Q less than one, an inefficient management is indicated. Cash & Growth is a useful indicator to identify any agent 
problems (Jensen, 1986 and Lang et al, 1991). High levels of cash flow, but low growth opportunities imply the presence of an 
agency problem.  
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Table 3. Input and output indicators (32 samples) 
Items 
t-1 t+0 t+1 t+3 
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max 
Equity ratio 0.36 -0.79 0.89 0.36 -0.74 0.75 0.39 0.21 0.75 0.38 0.18 0.71 
Inventory 
turnover 
0.94 0.03 6.55 0.67 0.14 3.48 0.49 0.02 2.31 0.44 0 3.76 
Receivables 
turnover Ratio 
227 1 5270 139 4 1990 117 2 1098 241 3 2141 
Return of equity -0.06 -1.5 0.33 0.12 0 0.44 0.12 0 0.55 0.11 -0.02 0.38 
Return on sales 0.23 -0.44 0.51 0.26 0.09 0.44 0.32 0.07 0.71 0.3 0.08 0.56 
Quick ratio 0.69 0.08 2.11 0.58 0.1 1.45 0.72 0.09 2.33 0.68 0.22 1.79 
Cash flow ratio -0.04 -1.37 0.78 0.04 -0.89 1.79 -0.13 -1.19 0.75 -0.1 -0.45 0.45 
Return of assets 0.02 -0.23 0.15 0.06 0 0.36 0.05 0 0.31 0.04 -0.01 0.1 
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Table 4. Efficiency of acquirers in different periods (32 samples) 
  
Organization 
Technical efficiency Pure technical efficiency Scale efficiency 
t-1 t+0 t+1 t+3 t-1 t+0 t+1 t+3 t-1 t+0 t+1 t+3 
1 0.94  0.83  0.62  0.53 0.99 0.92 0.67 0.70 0.96 0.90  0.93  0.76  
2 0.90  1.00  0.65  0.48 0.91 1.00 0.69 0.65 0.98 1.00  0.95  0.74  
3 1.00  0.62  0.61  0.75 1.00 1.00 0.81 1.00 1.00 0.62  0.75  0.75  
4 0.89  1.00  0.50  0.42 0.97 1.00 0.52 0.58 0.92 1.00  0.97  0.73  
5 1.00  1.00  0.58  0.79 1.00 1.00 0.59 0.85 1.00 1.00  0.99  0.92  
6 0.94  0.67  1.00  1.00 0.97 0.79 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.86  1.00  1.00  
7 1.00  0.77  1.00  0.36 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.82 1.00 0.77  1.00  0.44  
8 1.00  1.00  1.00  0.59 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.83 1.00 1.00  1.00  0.71  
9 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00  
10 1.00  1.00  0.76  0.49 1.00 1.00 0.78 0.58 1.00 1.00  0.97  0.84  
11 0.64  0.76  0.66  0.51 0.65 0.78 0.68 0.69 0.99 0.98  0.97  0.73  
12 0.86  0.90  0.75  0.56 0.91 0.96 0.78 0.76 0.94 0.95  0.97  0.73  
13 1.00  0.89  0.78  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.89  0.78  1.00  
14 1.00  1.00  0.64  0.62 1.00 1.00 0.86 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.75  0.62  
15 1.00  0.97  0.41  1.00 1.00 1.00 0.45 1.00 1.00 0.97  0.91  1.00  
16 1.00  1.00  1.00  0.85 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00  1.00  0.86  
17 1.00  1.00  0.70  1.00 1.00 1.00 0.88 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.80  1.00  
18 0.93  1.00  0.80  0.67 0.94 1.00 0.92 0.75 1.00 1.00  0.87  0.90  
19 0.51  0.57  0.37  0.29 0.54 0.63 0.50 0.49 0.96 0.91  0.74  0.59  
20 1.00  1.00  0.98  0.55 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.68 1.00 1.00  0.98  0.82  
21 1.00  1.00  0.60  1.00 1.00 1.00 0.62 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.97  1.00  
22 1.00  0.73  0.57  0.72 1.00 1.00 0.66 0.75 1.00 0.73  0.87  0.97  
23 1.00  1.00  0.91  0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.91  0.96  
24 0.65  0.91  0.62  0.74 0.71 0.96 0.66 0.79 0.91 0.95  0.93  0.94  
25 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00  
26 1.00  0.52  0.53  0.93 1.00 0.82 0.89 0.97 1.00 0.64  0.60  0.95  
27 0.56  0.57  0.34  1.00 0.62 0.68 0.60 1.00 0.91 0.83  0.57  1.00  
28 1.00  1.00  0.62  0.65 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.82 1.00 1.00  0.68  0.79  
29 1.00  1.00  0.76  1.00 1.00 1.00 0.89 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.85  1.00  
30 0.86  1.00  1.00  1.00 0.87 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00  1.00  1.00  
31 0.96  0.80  0.81  0.69 1.00 0.81 1.00 0.85 0.96 0.98  0.81  0.82  
32 1.00  1.00  0.44  0.68 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.92 1.00 1.00  0.89  0.74  
Mean 0.93  0.89  0.72  0.74 0.94 0.95 0.81 0.86 0.98 0.94  0.89  0.85  
Max 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00  
Min 0.51  0.52  0.34  0.29 0.54 0.63 0.45 0.49 0.91 0.62  0.57  0.44  
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Table 5. Malmquist Productivity Index of acquirers 
Org. 
Technical Efficiency 
Change (TEC) 
Technical Change (TC) 
Pure Technical Efficiency 
Change (PEC)  
Scale Efficiency Change 
(SEC) 
TFP Change (total factor 
productivity) 
t+0 t+1 t+3 Ave. t+0 t+1 t+3 Ave. t+0 t+1 t+3 Ave. t+0 t+1 t+3 Ave. t+0 t+1 t+3 Ave. 
1 0.88 0.75 0.86 0.83  0.97 1.53 1.25 1.23 0.93 0.72 1.06 0.89 0.94 1.04 0.81 0.93  0.85 1.15 1.07 1.01 
2 1.12 0.65 0.73 0.81  0.89 2.52 1.22 1.40 1.10 0.69 0.94 0.89 1.02 0.95 0.78 0.91  1.00 1.65 0.90 1.14 
3 0.62 0.99 1.23 0.91  1.17 1.67 1.20 1.33 1.00 0.81 1.23 1.00 0.62 1.22 1.00 0.91  0.72 1.65 1.47 1.20 
4 1.12 0.50 0.84 0.78  0.81 0.78 0.97 0.85 1.03 0.52 1.13 0.84 1.09 0.97 0.75 0.93  0.91 0.39 0.81 0.66 
5 1.00 0.58 1.35 0.92  0.89 2.31 0.72 1.14 1.00 0.59 1.45 0.95 1.00 0.99 0.94 0.97  0.89 1.34 0.98 1.05 
6 0.72 1.48 1.00 1.02  0.92 1.14 0.58 0.85 0.81 1.28 1.00 1.01 0.89 1.16 1.00 1.01  0.66 1.69 0.58 0.87 
7 0.77 1.30 0.36 0.71  0.87 1.43 0.91 1.04 1.00 1.00 0.82 0.94 0.77 1.30 0.44 0.76  0.67 1.86 0.33 0.74 
8 1.00 1.00 0.59 0.84  1.29 0.64 0.58 0.79 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.94 1.00 1.00 0.71 0.89  1.29 0.64 0.34 0.66 
9 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.07 1.13 1.70 1.27 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.07 1.13 1.70 1.27 
10 1.00 0.76 0.64 0.79  1.30 1.13 1.34 1.25 1.00 0.78 0.74 0.83 1.00 0.97 0.87 0.94  1.30 0.85 0.86 0.98 
11 1.20 0.86 0.78 0.93  0.92 1.22 0.93 1.01 1.20 0.87 1.02 1.02 1.00 0.98 0.76 0.91  1.09 1.05 0.72 0.94 
12 1.06 0.84 0.74 0.87  1.13 0.98 1.24 1.11 1.05 0.81 0.98 0.94 1.01 1.03 0.75 0.92  1.19 0.82 0.91 0.96 
13 0.89 0.88 1.29 1.00  0.98 1.75 0.63 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.89 0.88 1.29 1.00  0.87 1.54 0.82 1.03 
14 1.00 0.64 0.97 0.85  1.81 1.27 1.21 1.41 1.00 0.86 1.17 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.83 0.85  1.81 0.82 1.17 1.20 
15 0.97 0.42 2.44 1.00  0.86 2.47 0.61 1.09 1.00 0.45 2.21 1.00 0.97 0.94 1.10 1.00  0.83 1.04 1.49 1.09 
16 1.00 1.00 0.85 0.95  11.15 0.00 0.58 0.74 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.95  9.87 0.00 0.49 0.70 
17 1.00 0.70 1.42 1.00  0.70 1.66 1.23 1.13 1.00 0.88 1.14 1.00 1.00 0.80 1.25 1.00  0.70 1.17 1.75 1.13 
18 1.07 0.80 0.84 0.90  0.96 1.38 1.36 1.22 1.07 0.92 0.81 0.93 1.01 0.87 1.04 0.97  1.04 1.11 1.14 1.09 
19 1.12 0.64 0.79 0.83  1.11 1.49 0.93 1.15 1.17 0.80 0.99 0.97 0.96 0.81 0.80 0.85  1.24 0.96 0.74 0.95 
20 1.00 0.98 0.56 0.82  0.86 1.76 1.08 1.18 1.00 1.00 0.68 0.88 1.00 0.98 0.83 0.94  0.86 1.72 0.61 0.97 
21 1.00 0.60 1.67 1.00  0.63 1.30 0.98 0.93 1.00 0.62 1.62 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.03 1.00  0.63 0.78 1.65 0.93 
22 0.73 0.79 1.27 0.90  0.48 1.25 0.90 0.81 1.00 0.66 1.14 0.91 0.73 1.19 1.11 0.99  0.35 0.98 1.15 0.73 
23 1.00 0.91 1.05 0.99  0.88 1.27 1.22 1.11 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.91 1.05 0.99  0.88 1.16 1.28 1.09 
24 1.41 0.68 1.20 1.05  0.93 1.34 1.06 1.10 1.35 0.69 1.19 1.04 1.04 0.98 1.01 1.01  1.31 0.91 1.28 1.15 
25 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.84 4.22 0.57 1.27 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.84 4.22 0.57 1.27 
26 0.52 1.02 1.75 0.98  0.47 1.88 0.63 0.83 0.82 1.09 1.09 0.99 0.64 0.93 1.60 0.98  0.25 1.91 1.11 0.81 
27 1.01 0.61 2.91 1.21  0.86 1.95 0.49 0.94 1.09 0.88 1.67 1.17 0.92 0.69 1.75 1.03  0.87 1.19 1.43 1.14 
28 1.00 0.62 1.04 0.87  1.16 0.88 1.12 1.05 1.00 0.92 0.89 0.94 1.00 0.68 1.16 0.92  1.16 0.55 1.16 0.91 
29 1.00 0.76 1.32 1.00  1.87 0.83 7.23 2.24 1.00 0.89 1.12 1.00 1.00 0.85 1.17 1.00  1.87 0.63 9.51 2.24 
30 1.17 1.00 1.00 1.05  1.08 1.19 0.94 1.06 1.15 1.00 1.00 1.05 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.26 1.19 0.94 1.12 
31 0.83 1.01 0.86 0.90  0.98 1.20 1.10 1.09 0.81 1.24 0.85 0.95 1.02 0.82 1.01 0.95  0.81 1.22 0.94 0.98 
32 1.00 0.44 1.55 0.88  1.12 3.05 0.93 1.47 1.00 0.50 1.85 0.97 1.00 0.89 0.84 0.91  1.12 1.34 1.44 1.29 
Mean 0.96 0.79 1.03 0.92 1.31 1.03 0.99 1.10 1.01 0.83 1.07 0.97 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.95 1.26 0.81 1.02 1.01 
Note: If the TFP change index is larger than 1, then productivity in increasing, otherwise it implies a decline; Index in t+0 is 
based on a comparison with t-1, t+1 is based on t+0, and so on; Ave. means the average value of the index during the t-1 to t+3 
periods. Mean represents the average value of the entire sample in the same period.  
24 
 
 
 
